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"If the law supposes that," said Mr. Bumble, "the law is
a ass-a idiot." Since Dickens wrote those words a century ago,
many fictions in the law have been abolished. However, in the
year i935 the law permits a plaintiff to sue Corporation A and
Corporation B along with Mr. C and allege that the three de-
fendants wilfully shot and fired a revolver. Yet that same law
would not permit the plaintiff to sue these defendants upon
stating the facts in plain language to the effect that Mr. C was
working for Corporation A or Corporation B and while so
working fired the shot.
Why does not the law abandon the legal subtleties which
complicate litigation? Why does it not become more simplified
at least in its procedural aspect? The legal profession, which
is best able to bring about changes, is usually indifferent. There
may even be some opposition to change because of an unwill-
ingness to learn new ways.
In considering any change it must be recognized that the
legal procedure represents the manner in which law is admin-
istered. It generally reflects the habits and attitudes of the
group administeting the law. Those habits and attitudes can-
not be effectively formed or modified merely by an act of the
legislature or by a rule of court. The effective change is rather
the result of changing attitudes. For this reason changes must
necessarily come gradually.
The Ohio State Bar Association has been considering for
several years certain changes in pleading and practice. These
changes will only be crystallized into new rules when a senti-
ment is built up supporting the change.
These various changes are proposed as a result of a single
purpose, that of eliminating from litigation as many procedural
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questions as possible. There is too much litigation of pro-
cedure. These questions accumulate like snow on a rolling ball,
until the object is of an entirely different size and appearance.
The lawyers know that too many times the questions finally
considered by the court were entirely different from the ones
that the parties were disputing when they first approached the
courts.
This elimination of procedural questions can only be
brought about by giving the courts greater discretion. There
must be fewer rules which the court is obliged to follow under
penalty of reversal. There must be fewer times when the
attorney can say to the court, "You must do thus and so."
When a wider judicial discretion is advocated it must be ad-
mitted that this is in conflict with the certainty in the law which
the practitioner desires. He longs for the time when he can
predict with certainty for his client the legal consequences of
certain specified behavior, at which time, by the way, there
would be no need for lawyers. He sometimes is confused
about the certainty for which he is looking. There is a desira-
bility in having certainty in legal rules, especially certainty
in the rules of procedure. But this does not mean certainty
in the application of the rules, certainty in the result of litiga-
tion. Certainty in result means tyranny. The greatest cer-
tainty in the result of litigation probably occurs in Russia or
Germany today. Certainty is the antithesis of judicial discre-
tion.
The dread of judicial discretion often comes from an un-
willingness to trust the judges, many of whom have come to
the bench through the accidents of popular election. The entire
program of rigid procedure came along about the same time
as the popular election of judges. However, one wrong can-
not be corrected by another, and one cannot expect to counter-
balance the deficiencies of the judiciary with a rigid and inflex-
ible procedure. Greater discretion must be given the judges.
If they do no merit that discretion methods must be devised
of getting judges who will. The first premise, therefore, as
the basis of this discussion is that changes in procedure must be
adopted which will give the courts greater discretion.
This discussion of trial procedure is limited to the certain
proposals before the bar association and these relate to more
liberal provisions of joinder and the adoption of summary
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judgment procedure. These changes in joinder procedure were
approved by the bar association about two years ago but senti-
ment has not yet crystallized into action.
Instead of discussing these new rules in the abstract, a few
illustrations will be given which will more vividly present the
problem. These cases are illustrative of the many similar cases
that come within the experience of any lawyer.
In the first case the plaintiff was suing for damages arising
out of personal injuries caused by a night watchman at certain
railroad yards. A detective agency claims the watchman
worked for the railroad and the railroad claims he worked for
the detective agency. The plaintiff first chose to sue the rail-
road and when the testimony seemed to show employment by
the agency the plaintiff dismissed his case. The plaintiff then
commenced another action against the three defendants on the
theory of joint liability, alleging that the three defendants fired
the shot. The use of this fiction was necessary because there is
no provision in Ohio permitting joinder in the alternative. Of
course at the trial when the facts are brought out the plaintiff
must elect the defendant against whom he wishes to continue
suit. The sensible and economical procedure is to sue all parties
in the alternative.
The second case was a personal injury action growing out of
a collision caused by a truck operated by Armour & Co. It ap-
peared that there were two corporations named Armour & Co.,
a Maine corporation and a Kentucky corporation. The driver
did not know which company he worked for, although it was
conceded it was one corporation or the other. The plaintiff
can not sue these defendants in the alternative but must choose
at his peril which defendant he wished to hold.
The third case was a personal injury action against an in-
surance company and the driver of an automobile. An import-
ant question in dispute was whether the driver was an agent or
an an independent contractor. If the latter, the company would
not be liable and if the former, both would be liable but could
not be sued together. The plaintiff can present this question
only through the fiction of joint liability. But it seems incon-
sistent with the theory of the codes to admit that if a person
would plead the facts and claims that plaintiff was either an
independent contractor or an agent he would fail to state a cause
of action. If this had been a contract case the plaintiff could
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not have concealed the issue behind the concept of joint liability
and he must at his peril elect whether to use the principal or the
independent contractor.
The next case deals with possible joinder of plaintiffs. This
case was one of three suits brought by three plaintiffs for money
invested because of fraud of defendant stockbroker. Each of
these three cases took several days to try and the real matters in
dispute were questions of fraud and the liability of the bonds-
man. The facts concerning the amount of investment by each
plaintiff were not in dispute. No provision exists for compell-
ing the joinder of these claims, although they can be conveni-
ently tried together at a great saving of expense to the state.
The last case was an action by a child for damages arising
out of personal injuries. After a week's trial a verdict was
returned for the defendant. However, the state had to finance
a retrial of these same facts in two other suits. The father's
suit for loss of services, and the suit by the mother for her
injuries. This entire matter could have been tried in one suit.
Joinder provisions have been so complicated by legalistic
distinctions that either side has a sporting chance of winning
and the matter of trial conveniences is entirely lost sight of.
With restricted public budgets this problem of the expense of
litigation is no idle matter. If the public knew how much they
are really being gypped by the complexities of our procedure
they would be up on their hind legs howling. It may be that
the lawyers' safeguard is to keep it complex. When one sees
how slow the legal profession is sometimes to accept procedural
reform, he is reminded of Bernard Shaw's statement that "a
profession is conspiracy against the laity."
However, the legal profession should accept these changes
not from the standpoint of society, although it would be respon-
sive to such appeal, but from the standpoint of the professional
interests in making court processes better able to accomplish the
things they were set up to accomplish.
Now how can this matter be remedied. In 1875 England
adopted a very simple procedure. There were no new concepts
introduced that involve refined analysis, and prolonged liti-
gation. It was there provided that parties, plaintiff or defend-
ant, may be joined, either j ointly, severally or in the alternative
when common questions of law and fact exist arising out of the
same transaction or series of transactions and that, whenever the
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interest of the parties requires, the court may order separate
trials. Also the court may order a consolidation of separate
trials if the circumstances seem to wararnt it.
This liberal procedure has been adopted in nine states. The
last one was Illinois in the new practice act which went into
effect a year ago, after the bar association of that state had
worked on the act for two years.
All the present complexities of joinders will be wiped out
and those problems in litigation will be eliminated. One will
no longer be bothered with the intricacies of joint liability in
automobile accidents. If the same facts are being litigated, the
cases can be tried together. Similarly a master and servant
could be joined as they can be in all but two or three states and
a present resort to a fiction need not be necessary. Ohio is the
only code state which does not permit the master to be sued
with the servant when the master's liability is based solely on
the acts of the servant. This result in Ohio is based on concepts
of liability arising out of common law procedure which concepts
have long been abandoned.
It is sometimes argued that with too free joinder a trial
will be so complicated that a jury cannot handle the case. Or-
dinarily the interest of the plaintiff will keep him from unduly
complicating his case and the court can protect a defendant if
the circumstances are so unusual that special prejudice results.
A few years ago an investigation was made of the extent
to which this freedom of joinder had been abused in New York.
In checking over the cases for two years in New York County it
was found there was not one time when the court was asked to
grant separate trials because of prejudicial joinder. There were
a good many instances where trials were consolidated, usually
cases involving automobile accidents.
These simple changes in joinder requirements will eliminate
many of the present problems based upon legalistic subtleties
which infest our litigation and the trial courts will be empow-
ered to control matters of joinder on the basis of trial conveni-
ence of the parties and in the interest of the state.
Another change in trial practice is being proposed. This
involves giving the courts greater control over the issues to be
tried, which control can be exercised by the use of the summary
judgment procedure. Too many cases are placed on the trial
calendar when there is no real issue presented by the answer.
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This congests trial dockets and the state is required to furnish
increased facilities. Many of these defenses are interposed for
the purpose of delay or to force some sort of a compromise.
The remedy for this evil is the adoption of the summary
judgment procedure. In contract actions or actions for the
specific restitution of property, the plaintiff may file an affidavit
supporting his claim upon which the court may enter judgment
unless the defendant files an affidavit of merits showing a good
defense to all or to some part of the claim. The court can,
therefore, make this preliminary finding of an issuable contro-
versy, and in case there is an issue made upon part of the con-
troversy the trial can be restricted to that question.
This procedure was introduced in England in i8 55, in On-
tario in 1875, and has been adopted in seven states in this coun-
try. In New York it has proved so satisfactory that last year
its use was much extended. In England in 1930 there were
5535 summary judgments rendered by the High Court of
Justice and only 1226 judgments rendered after trial. That
is, there were four and one half times as many summary judg-
ments as trials. In Ontario the summary judgments outnum-
ber the trials, three to two. In New York this percentage is
not so great but there is a substantial percentage eliminated this
way. Justice Finch in discussing the New York procedure said
that in New York County in 1933 there were 1569 applications
for summary judgments of which 988 were granted, and that
if these cases had been tried two more judges would have been
needed. In Detroit a recent study of the Michigan Judicial
Council showed that for a period of eight months in 193 1, 409
cases were disposed of by summary judgment and 1834 by trial.
That is, about 2o per cent of the cases disposed of were by sum-
mary judgment.
This summary judgment procedure is almost imperative if
and when justice courts are abolished and the cases are filed in
a small claims branch of the common pleas court. A recent
study of justice court litigation shows that practically all the
civil cases before justice courts are of the type which are subject
to summary judgments. There were less than 2 per cent which
were of the damage variety. These cases usually do not involve
disputed amounts but merely seek the court processes for collec-
tion of the debts. Such cases must be screened out of those
awaiting trial.
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This preliminary hearing of the issues by the court is a step
in the direction of giving the court more control in the issue
forming processes. Experience has shown that the pleading
practices often involve evasion, subterfuge, and deception. The
mere statutory requirement that the parties state the facts will
not be enought to simplify pleading when the court permits the
allegations of such general abstractions as the operative facts,
together with the general or specific denials of those facts. The
present system of pleading is almost as ritualistic as the common
law system. In Franklin County last fall the judge on the
motion docket ruled on 500 motions and demurrers, about ten
each day. A great many of these involved a juggling of sym-
bols and phrases according to accepted conventions without
really disclosing the specific matters to be tried. Courts must
step in and have more of a part in determining what the issues
are, if any. A move in that direction is the summary judgment
proceeding.
These changes are steps in the direction of elevating the
position of the trial judge in the administration of justice. The
settlement of the merits of the controversy will be the chief aim
and the rules of administration will become merely means to
that end. The practice of law will not be a mere game to be
played by some intricate set of rules, but a serious attempt to
settle the problems of litigating parties according to their
broader social interests, and the administration of justice will
to a greater extent merit public confidence and respect.
